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Abstract
This paper examines the location of headquarter growth of large public companies during
the 1990s. Headquarters continue to be attracted by large metropolitan areas. Yet among
that group they continue to disperse into medium-sized centers. This paper identifies 6
different categories of gross flows underlying the net change of headquarters observed
during the 90s. There is strong variation among the 50 largest metro areas in terms of the
composition of these gross flows. On average, entry and exit represent over 2/3 of all
gross flow activity. Pure relocation of headquarters is found to lead to urbanization.
Mergers tend to not impact the distributing of headquarters across MSAs. A binomial
probability model of the decision to move utilizes company-level as well as MSA-level
data and finds that MSA-level amenities impact the choice to move.
JEL codes: R 12, R 30, L 20
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Motivation
The growth and locational patterns of large corporate headquarters have been a
subject of research dating back to the latter half of the twentieth century (see Lichtenberg,
1960, Evans, 1973, and Quante, 1976, for a synopsis of earlier work). Ross (1987)
compares corporate headquarter location between 1955 and 1977. Studies using more
recent data to track the distribution of headquarters over time tend to rely on Fortune 500
data. Horst and Koropeckyi (2000) and Holloway and Wheeler (1991) base their time-
series analysis on data for Fortune 500 companies. Holloway and Wheeler (1991)
conduct their empirical analysis for the 1980s using annual data for that decade. Horst
and Koropeckyi (2000) utilize the same data from 1975 through 1999 (in five-year
intervals).  A set of different papers analyzes larger data sets but only utilizes their cross-
sectional information. Shilton and Stanley (1999) draw on data for all publicly traded
companies, regardless of company size, and Davis (2000) draws on data from the Census
Survey of Auxiliary Establishments. Klier and Testa (2002) combine these two aspects of
the literature and present information on a panel of all large publicly traded companies
they tracked for the 1990s.
A common finding in all these papers is the high degree of concentration among
headquarters. For example, Shilton and Stanley (1999) report that 40 percent of their
sample is located in only 20 U.S. counties. They explain this stylized fact by the
comparative advantage of cities to support headquarters operations. In fact, Horst and
Koropeckyi (2000) report a strengthening of that effect during the 1990s as evidenced by
a substantial drop of Fortune 500 headquarters located in non-metropolitan counties. In
addition, the advantage of certain cities in hosting headquarters operations seems to
depend little on the historic and perhaps serendipitous presence of individual companies.
For example, despite Boston’s ongoing strength as a domicile of Fortune 500 companies
headquarters, only two of the 15 present in 1999 had been there since 1975 (Horst and
Koropeckyi, 2000). 
At the same time, headquarter concentration continues to be shifting toward metro
areas that do not rank at the top of the size distribution. In 1955, the first year the Fortune
500 list was compiled, the New York metro area was home to 31 percent of all company3
headquarters on the list, the vast majority of which were located right in the city (28
percent of all Fortune 500 headquarters). While the metro area share of national
headquarters remained stable until the early 1970s, the city began to lose headquarters to
its surrounding areas in the mid-1960s. For the last 30 years, the share of headquarters
domiciled in the New York metro area has been steadily declining. By 1999, it had fallen
to 10 percent of Fortune 500 companies (see Quante, 1976, and Horst and Koropeckyi,
2000). Ross (1987) finds the biggest gains not among the largest cities but among other
large cities that often experience rapid population growth during the same time period.
Holloway and Wheeler (1991) find that “in many ways the changes experienced during
the 1980s in location of major corporate headquarters and the assets they control were not
qualitatively different from those experienced earlier. New York continued its decline for
a third decade and…the chief beneficiaries were other large centers that had large enough
infrastructures to be attractive as corporate headquarters locations.” (p.72) In their
analysis of gross flows of headquarters they find that mergers and acquisitions, as
opposed to direct relocations, are a direct mechanism leading to the deconcentration of
headquarters. Klier and Testa (2002) and Klier (2002) analyze a more broadly defined set
of observations and find the long-term trend of deconcentration of headquarters to have
continued during the 90s.
A second strand in the literature asks what city characteristics are associated with
the location of headquarters. Utilizing Census microdata Davis and Henderson (2003)
estimate a poisson model of the location pattern of firm births. The underlying
presumption is that firms choose locations in order to maximize profit. The authors report
evidence of headquarter agglomeration, specifically, positive effects both for the diversity
of local service inputs as well as the scale of other headquarters nearby. Lovely and
Rosenthal (2003) find evidence of agglomeration among companies that export to foreign
markets. Headquarter activities of exporters are more spatially concentrated when
information on the foreign market is difficult to obtain.
This paper presents detailed information on the gross flows of headquarters of
large publicly traded companies during the 90s. It investigates the effects of pure
relocations and mergers and acquisitions on the distribution of headquarters among
metropolitan areas. Furthermore, it estimates both a metropolitan area level model of4
gross flows as well as a company-level probit model of the probability to move. A
number of city-level characteristics as well as company-level control variables are found
to significantly influence the location choice of headquarters during the 1990s.
Data
Information on the location and characteristics of companies comes from
Compustat data on publicly traded companies for the year 1990 and 2000. The data
represent a panel of all public companies whose shares are traded in the U.S., with the
exception of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), closed-end mutual fund index
shares, and pre-Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB) companies.
1 Active
companies are either publicly traded companies or are required to file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. 
The database identifies a company’s headquarter location, its total employment,
and assets, both total assets as well as assets held abroad. In addition, by way of
Compustat’s “mergertracker” data, we obtained detailed records on individual corporate
actions such as mergers, companies going private, companies entering bankruptcy etc.
2
This information will be very useful in identifying detailed gross flows of headquarters
(see below).
This paper focuses on the location of large company headquarters, where large is
defined as total worldwide employment of at least 2,500. Headquarter locations are
aggregated by metropolitan areas. Specifically, the paper uses the most extensive
definition of metropolitan areas, the so-called consolidated metropolitan statistical area
(CMSA).
3 Thus, the results are not affected by relocations of headquarters from a central
city to a suburban location within the same metropolitan area. The underlying assumption
is that a metropolitan area’s different locales share common attributes relevant to the
siting of a headquarter. Some important attributes include hub airports, access to business
service firms, and a common skilled labor pool.
                                                          
1 Compustat created “pre-FASB” company records upon introduction of FASB rule 94 regarding the
accounting of financial service subsidiaries to show consistency between current and historical data.
2 About 80% of corporate actions identified in the data are mergers.5
Applying the 2,500 employee cutoff, results in 1,397 metropolitan area based
records in 1990 and 1,805 in 2000. The actual data work is performed on a slightly
smaller set. After excluding publicly traded holding companies as well as banks, there are
1,245 records of large companies in 1990 and 1,703 records in 2000, about 20% of the
database in both years.
4 In essence, the data is considerably larger than the Fortune 500,
yet it includes essentially all Fortune 500 companies.
Changing distribution of headquarters among the largest 50 MSAs
5
During the 90s the number of large publicly traded companies in the U.S. grew by
37%. At the same time, the concentration of these companies’ headquarters among the
most populous of metropolitan areas hardly changed (see table 1). Yet, the distribution of
headquarters within the 50 largest metro areas changed much more noticeably.
Specifically, the MSAs ranked 6 through 50 in terms of population in the year 2000
increased their share of large company headquarters from 51% to 54% during the 90s,
while the share of the 5 largest MSAs fell from 35% to 33%.   This development can also
be shown by means of a Lorenz curve (see figure 1). A Lorenz curve graphs cumulative
frequency distributions. It shows the degree to which a distribution is concentrated by the
distance between the actual distribution and the 45 degree line, which represents an
egalitarian distribution. Figure 1 graphs the cumulative distribution of headquarters on
one axis versus the cumulative distribution of metropolitan areas on the other axis. In that
distribution, each metro area is treated as an equally weighted entity. The shape of the
                                                                                                                                                                            
3 For example, the Chicago CMSA encompasses the primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs) of
Chicago, IL, Gary, IN, Kankakee, IL, and Kenosha, WI.
4 Publicly traded holding companies were excluded to avoid possible double counting in case a subsidiary
is a publicly traded company as well. For example, both UAL Corp. and United Airlines, its subsidiary, are
included in the original database. They are both are headquartered at the same address and report the same
employment. Our analysis only keeps the record on United Airlines. Depository institutions, that is SIC
group 60, were excluded as the banking sector was impacted systematically different from the rest of the
economy by the loosening of bank-specific regulations during the 90s. Large financial institutions
gravitated towards larger metropolitan areas during the 90s. This is the result of profound regulatory
changes which encouraged firm consolidation and market expansion. At the same time the number of all
publicly traded banks, regardless of size, went up by more than 2.5, from 196 to 514, during the 90s,
despite the consolidation.
5 The results presented in tables 1 through 4 are very similar to what can be found in Klier (2002). They
are, however, not identical. Differences are explained by a “bug” in the geocoding software. It was6
plotted line reveals the degree of concentration in the distribution of headquarters. For
example, if each of the largest 50 metropolitan areas contained the same number of
corporate headquarters, the graph line would be identical to the 45 degree line. In
contrast, to the extent that some metropolitan areas host disproportionate numbers of
headquarters, the graph curve will be bowed out toward the “southeast,” away from the
45 degree line. Figure 1 shows these curves for both 1990 and 2000 to illustrate changes
in the concentration of headquarters within the largest 50 metropolitan areas. We can see
that for the entire range the distribution became less concentrated during the last decade.
In the year 2000 about 60% of large company headquarters reside in the 10 largest of the
50 largest MSAs. 
Table 1 also provides some information on the changing distribution of assets. We
can see that despite the loss of headquarters, New York’s share of assets increased during
the 90s from 27 to 33%. In 2000, New York’s assets are 6 times the size of the runner up
MSA.
6 
Table 2 breaks out the net flow of headquarters experienced during the 90s by
MSA. Column 7 lists each MSAs share of the stock of headquarters in 1990. Column 8
shows the MSAs share of the sum of net flows during the 90s. 20 of the 50 MSAs listed
experienced a share of net change that is greater than their share of the stock of
headquarters at the beginning of the decade (percentages listed in bold). Only 2 of these,
Washington D.C. and San Francisco, are in the 5 most populous MSAs. 
Identifying gross flows of headquarters
This paper also identifies the gross flows of headquarters by MSAs. The
underlying idea is that the gross flows resulting in the observed net changes can provide
rich information to explain the overall observed net change in headquarters (see
Holloway and Wheeler, 1991). In order to identify the gross flows, we utilize the fact that
Compustat uses unique I.D. numbers for each company. Thus one can identify companies
that were present in 1990 but no longer in the database in 2000 – i.e. exiters --, and, if the
                                                                                                                                                                            
discovered after completing last year’s paper. Results presented in this paper supersede comparable tables
in Klier (2002).7
change occurred in the opposite direction, entrants. Entrants are represented by newly
formed companies as well as private companies having gone public. Exiters are cases
where a public company has gone out of business, has gone private, or was bought out by
another company. Finally, because this paper focuses only on large public companies,
one has to allow for companies changing size during the decade. That is, a company that
was large in 1990 can fall below the 2,500 employment in 2000.
7 Correspondingly, if a
company grows in size but stays in the same metro area, it is classified as “grow”. If a
company relocated its headquarter during the decade, it is counted as a move. In addition,
Compustat data on corporate actions by company allows us to distinguish between pure
relocations and, for example, merger-induced relocations later.
Table 3 lists the observations in the gross flow categories thus obtained.  They
consist of survivors, which break down in stayers, which either do or do not cross the
“large” size threshold, and movers, as well as entrants and exiters. Table 4 turns the gross
flows reported in the previous table into shares of the total gross flow activity. Gross flow
activity is obtained by adding the flows across 6 of the 7 categories identified above in
each metro area (“stay and large” is not treated as a flow). Several points can be made
about the level and composition of gross flows of headquarters for the 50 largest MSAs. 
First, the level of gross flows is on average 3.6 times larger than the level of net
change. In fact, for the largest metro areas, such as New York and Los Angeles, it is
larger by approximately an order of magnitude (see Table 3). Across all 50 metro areas,
new entrants and exits represent by far the largest share of gross flows (see Table 4).
Together they account for 70% of gross flow activity. The growth of existing companies
represents 14% of overall gross flows, with the remaining categories (shrink in size as
well as in- and out moves) jointly accounting for only 16% of overall activity. 
Second, there are noticeable differences across the 50 metro areas in terms of the
composition of gross flows. For example, Detroit, New Orleans, Portland, Oregon, and
Salt Lake City, rank high in terms of share of gross flow activity represented by
companies exiting the database. Conversely, Nashville, Tennessee, experienced the
                                                                                                                                                                            
6 Halloway and Wheeler (1991) reported New York’s level of Fortune 500 company assets to be over 5.5
times that of the runner up.
7 In fact, we account for this case for both movers and stayers. Furthermore, a relocation can cross the
metro area / non-metro area boundary in either direction.8
second highest share of new companies during the 90s. Metro areas that have a level of
gross flow activity of at least 10 and have been experiencing high shares of headquarters
moving in are San Diego, Orlando, Greensboro, and West Palm Beach. Incidentally,
three of these four metro areas are in the group of 5 with the highest mean January
temperatures of the MSAs included in this study. 
Pure relocations
Arguably the most interesting policy questions are related to what MSA-level
characteristics attract headquarters. In order to address this question, this section presents
detailed information on the directionality of relocation of large company headquarters, or
how large companies voted on their headquarter location with their feet during the 90s. In
our data set, 149 relocations of headquarters occur during the 1990s. Of these we classify
101 as “pure” or “organic” moves, i.e. relocations we could not associate with a corporate
action, such as a merger or acquisition.
8 Table 5 presents a directionality matrix for these
101 cases.
9 The table links origin and destination of each relocation and aggregates
MSAs in groups of 10, with New York broken out as its own category. In addition,
MSAs not among the 50 most populous ones as well as non-MSA locations are shown as
separate categories. The column labelled “New York” shows where companies that
relocated to New York had moved from. The row labelled “New York” shows where
companies that relocated away from New York had moved to. 
In order to interpret this transition matrix, we would like to distinguish three
different areas in it. Cells along the diagonal refer to companies that reloacted within the
same size category MSA; e.g. a move within the New York MSA. On balance this
category is empty, with only 16 of 101 pure relocations being located along the diagonal.
The triangle above the diagonal lists the cases where a company moved from a larger to a
smaller MSA, resulting in deconcentration of headquarters across the MSAs. The triangle
below the diagonal (shaded) lists headquarters that relocated from a smaller to a larger
MSA, resulting in urbanization of headquarters. Table 5 illustrates that pure relocations
                                                          
8 For example, Boeing’s move from Seattle to Chicago would fit that category.9
of large public companies in the 90s, on balance, resulted in urbanization of headquarter
locations as the direction of the move was towards larger metropolitan areas. Among the
8 categories of MSAs distinguished in that table, only New York, MSAs rank 51 and
higher, as well as nonmetropolitan area locations experienced a deconcentration of
headquarters due to “organic moves”.
Tables 6 and 7 follow up on that analysis. In Table 6, panels A and B, we ask if
the urbanization effect holds up after we account for the sectoral composition of the
companies who moved. In other words, we are looking for evidence of industry
agglomeration effects. It turns out that only in the case of pure relocations of non-
manufacturing companies – they account for 54 of the 101 observations in table 5 (see
table 6 panel B) – is there evidence of agglomeration. On balance 54% of these moves
result in concentration vs 27% leading to deconcentration. On the other hand, pure moves
of manufacturing companies on balance lead to deconcentration (49% of observations, vs
38% leading to concentration). That result is driven by companies that were initially
located within the 10 largest MSAs.
Finally, table 7, presents evidence on the transition matrix for mergers and
acquisitions. There were a total of 181 mergers of large public companies during the 90s.
Table 7 lists them by where the acquired company (ACQ) and the acquiring company
(ACQNG) were headquartered. In contrast to the move matrixes presented above, the
data on mergers show that the largest share of mergers involved companies that were
located in the same MSA size group. In other words, observations located on the diagonal
in that table represent 42% of all mergers. That is a striking difference to the pure
relocation activity, where we found that a move most likely results in the company
changing the size of MSA it is located in. In terms of the overall effect on the
concentration of headquarters among MSAs, mergers are on balance neutral: in 28% of
acquisitions the acquiring company is located in a larger MSA, whereas in 30% of
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 We also performed the analysis for all 149 moves. Table 9 presents a simple model that estimates the two
types of moves separately. See Table 10 for a company level estimation of the probability to move among
surviving companies.10




Gross flows of Headquarters
The remainder of the paper tries to explain the growth of headquarters across
metro areas by means of multiple regression analysis. We first estimate the level of gross
flows of headquarters at the MSA level. The objective is to formally link metropolitan
area characteristics with headquarter location choices. The model is set up as follows:
Level of headquarter gross flows = f(MSA size, MSA industry mix, MSA
amenities, MSA workforce characteristics)
The independent variables consist of a number of  variables controlling for MSA-
level characteristics as well as some amenity and workforce characteristics. In order to
minimize the effect of a small base at the start of the decade, the data include only the 50
largest metropolitan areas. The descriptive data presented earlier suggest a number of
influences on the change in the concentration of headquarters during the last decade. 
The high degree of concentration of headquarters among a relatively small
number of metro areas suggest the existence of scale effects in hosting headquarter
operations. This effect is measured by the level of headquarters present at the beginning
of the decade. Also included is a variable measuring the percent change in population
during the decade. This variable is expected to capture the shifting of markets away from
the traditional centers of commerce and population and show a positive sign. One might
also see such a response to growing population because the universe of large companies
is increasingly composed of service rather than manufacturing companies. In addition,
                                                          
10 That result differs from what Holloway and Wheeler find on the role of mergers and acquisitions (see
quote on page 3 of this paper). While we cannot replicate their methodology, we approximate their
approach by considering mergers only among the 50 largest metropolitan areas (included in table 7). In that
case, we find an even larger share of transactions to occur within similarly sized MSAs. However, there is a
slightly higher incidence of mergers leading to deconcentration (28% of observations) vs leading to
concentration (22% of observations). Their reported results do not allow us to quantify their findings of
mergers on deconcentration.11
service companies tend to be more regional than national or international in market
scope.
Two variables control for the sectoral composition of the metropolitan areas. The
first of these two is the share of manufacturing earnings in all nonfarm earnings (1989
data) in each metropolitan area. It is expected to be negatively related to the growth in
headquarters as the Northeast and Midwest have been losing their dominance in
manufacturing production to other regions. However, as documented by Rees (1978) and
others, headquarters tend to remain behind, or follow regional demand shifts only with
long lags. Second, a comparable share for employment in the FIRE sector proxies for the
degree to which a metro area specializes in the provision of business services. The
following suggests a positive relationship to headquarter growth. Much of the activity in
FIRE industries is of the type purchased and outsourced by headquarters. Purportedly
owing to the forces of globalization, headquarters are increasingly seeking to locate
where such services are accessible. The model also controls for the regional composition
of headquarters growth by means of a binary variable that measures if the MSA is loacted
in the South, as defined by the Census region.
Two variables try to capture metro area level amenities. From the FAA’s T100
data one can obtain the number of foreign destinations served by non-stop flights
originating at an MSA’s airports. A larger choice of international destinations is expected
to make a MSA more attractive as a headquarter location.
11
A second variable, the average daily temperature in January, is trying to measure a
region’s amenities in broader terms. Headquarter operations may want to locate where
people want to live.
Finally, the model also includes two variables measuring workforce
characteristics: the education of the MSAs workforce (percent of workforce with
bachelor degree) as well as the share of foreign born in an MSAs’ population. One of the
frequently mentioned metro area attributes valued by headquarter operations is the
presence of a skilled labor pool.
                                                          
11 The data on temperature can be found at: http://ggweather.com/ccd/meantemp.htm, the data on
international destinations can be found at: http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/aviation/international-series/12
Table 8 show unambiguously that the scale effect of hosting headquarters matters
statistically in each of the gross flow estimations. The higher the level of headquarters in
a given MSA at the beginning of the 90s, the higher the observed level of gross flows
during the decade. Relative to that dominant effect, most of the other variables do not add
to the explanatory power of the model. That might well be related to the fact that these
equations are estimated only for the 50 most populous MSAs. However, the two regional
fixed effects (south, average January temperature) tend to increase the level of moves –
both in and out. Curiously, temperature is negatively related to the level of companies
staying put. Finally, the measure of workforce education has a statistically significant
positive effect on the level of both in-movers as well as entrants. Table 9 breaks out the
estimation of in-moves into pure relocation and others. It is interesting that the regional
amenities variables impact only pure relocation cases.
Probability of moving
Table 10 presents evidence on a second approach to estimating headquarter
location. In light of the rather large number of observations we estimate a probit model of
the probability for a company to move its headquarter during the 90s. This model utilizes
both MSA-level as well as company-level data. A unit of observation is a company that
survived from 1990 to 2000. If it relocated its headquarter, it is coded as “1”, otherwise
as “0”. About 13% of surviving companies moved during the 90s.
12 In addition to the
MSA level variables introduced above, this probit estimation utilizes a number of
company level independent variables. We control for company size by way of its
operating income. A company’s degree of global exposure is measured by the share of its
assets haled abroad. We control by means of dummy variables if the company was large
during the entire decade, as well if it grew into a large company. Finally, we control for
the number of corporate actions (mergers) a company undertook during the decade as
well as its sector. Furthermore, we added a measure of the cost of doing business in a
                                                          
12 Equations 1 and 3 in Table 10 are estimated for 1009 observations. In essence that includes all the
records on surviving companies except for a small number (56) for which some of the independent
variables had missing values. Equations 2 and 4 are currently constrained by the fact that the MSA-level
variables are collected only for the 50 largest MSAs. Hence the difference in the number of observations.13
metropolitan area. The actual variable measures the MSA-level wage bill in 1990 and
divides that by the size of the workforce.
Among the company-level variables, both the measure of globalness (share of
foreign assets) as well as the count of corporate actions are consistently significant in
influencing the choice to move. More global companies are less likely to move during the
90s. On the other hand, companies active in mergers are more likely to move. As far as
the MSA-level variables are concerned, there are a number of interesting findings as well.
Growing MSAs are more likely to lose companies. A more educated workforce, however,
makes out-moves less likely. Similary, a more global MSA (defined by foreign share of
MSA aggregate assets) as well as a higher number of foreign destinations that can be
reached from an MSAs airport(s) also make outmoves of large companies less likely. To
sum up, this model allows a much richer empirical result in terms of relating MSA-level
variables to a company’s decision to relocate its headquarters.
Conclusion
This paper addresses two questions: How did the concentration of large public
companies’ headquarters across metropolitan areas change during the 90s. Second, what
city characteristics are associated with gross flows of  company headquarters across
metropolitan areas. It addresses these questions with data that include all publicly traded
companies. Two trends, established in previous literature, are confirmed. Headquarters
disproportionately locate in large metropolitan areas. Within that group, headquarters
continue to disperse toward medium-sized, fast-growing metropolitan areas. In addition,
this paper presents information on 6 categories of gross flows of headquarters underlying
the observed net changes. There is strong variation among the 50 largest MSAs in terms
of the composition of these gross flows. On average, entry and exit of companies to or
from a metro area tend to represent around 2/3 of all gross flow activity for the 50 largest
MSAs. 14
Detailed investigation of 101 pure relocations of headquarters during the 90s finds
evidence of urbanization in headquarter location. Companies that move locate, on
balance, in differently sized metropolitan areas. Yet, manufacturing companies are found,
on net, to move out of the 10 largest MSAs, especially New York. The evidence on the
effect of mergers on the distribution of headquarters is noticeable different. The majority
of mergers involves companies that are located in similarly sized cities. On net, mergers
foster neither concentration nor deconcentration of headquarters.
Two models of headquarter location are estimated. A MSA-level model of the
gross flows of headquarters during the 90s find limited evidence of the role of MSA-level
amenities on headquarter location. A company-level probit estimation of the probability
to move produces fairly strong results on the importance of company- as well as city-
level characteristics in driving headquarter location. For example, a higher number of
mergers that a company has gone through make it more likely to have moved.
Conversely, the degree of globalness of an MSA as well as the number of international
destinations reachable from its airport(s) reduce the likelihood of a company moving out
of that MSA.15
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POPULATION HEADQUARTERS ASSETS
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Top 5 MSAs 0.28 0.27 0.35 0.33 0.44 0.51
Top 5 x NY 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.18
Rank 6 to 22 0.27 0.28 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.28
Rank 23 to 50 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.13
Top 50 0.71 0.72 0.86 0.87 0.92 0.92
Remainder 0.29 0.28 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.08






































































2000Table 2: Net Change in HQs
MSA 2000 Population HQs90 HQs2000 Net Change Growth Rate Share of Base Share of Net Change
New York--Northern New Jersey--Long Island, NY--NJ--CT--PA CMSA 21,199,865 191 217 26 14% 19% 6%
Chicago--Gary--Kenosha, IL--IN--WI CMSA 9,157,540 81 98 17 21% 8% 4%
San Francisco--Oakland--San Jose, CA CMSA 7,039,362 46 83 37 80% 4% 9%
Los Angeles--Riverside--Orange County, CA CMSA 16,373,645 70 81 11 16% 7% 3%
Dallas--Fort Worth, TX CMSA 5,221,801 52 71 19 37% 5% 5%
Philadelphia--Wilmington--Atlantic City, PA--NJ--DE--MD CMSA 6,188,463 52 66 14 27% 5% 3%
Houston--Galveston--Brazoria, TX CMSA 4,669,571 33 62 29 88% 3% 7%
Boston--Worcester--Lawrence, MA--NH--ME--CT CMSA 5,819,100 49 61 12 24% 5% 3%
Washington--Baltimore, DC--MD--VA--WV CMSA 7,608,070 35 57 22 63% 3% 5%
Atlanta, GA MSA 4,112,198 24 49 25 104% 2% 6%
Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN--WI MSA 2,968,806 36 48 12 33% 4% 3%
St. Louis, MO--IL MSA 2,603,607 24 39 15 63% 2% 4%
Cleveland--Akron, OH CMSA 2,945,831 31 31 0 0% 3% 0%
Detroit--Ann Arbor--Flint, MI CMSA 5,456,428 25 29 4 16% 2% 1%
Miami--Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA 3,876,380 13 29 16 123% 1% 4%
Denver--Boulder--Greeley, CO CMSA 2,581,506 10 25 15 150% 1% 4%
Nashville, TN MSA 1,231,311 72 4 1 72 4 3 % 1 % 4%
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ MSA 3,251,876 10 23 13 130% 1% 3%
Milwaukee--Racine, WI CMSA 1,689,572 17 22 5 29% 2% 1%
Cincinnati--Hamilton, OH--KY--IN CMSA 1,979,202 16 20 4 25% 2% 1%
Columbus, OH MSA 1,540,157 11 19 8 73% 1% 2%
Richmond--Petersburg, VA MSA 996,512 10 19 9 90% 1% 2%
Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearwater, FL MSA 2,395,997 91 9 1 01 1 1 % 1 % 2%
Pittsburgh, PA MSA 2,358,695 17 18 1 6% 2% 0%
San Diego, CA MSA 2,813,833 9 18 9 100% 1% 2%
Seattle--Tacoma--Bremerton, WA CMSA 3,554,760 17 16 -1 -6% 2% 0%
Kansas City, MO--KS MSA 1,776,062 14 16 2 14% 1% 0%
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA 1,251,509 6 14 8 133% 1% 2%
Portland--Salem, OR--WA CMSA 2,265,223 13 13 0 0% 1% 0%
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill, NC--SC MSA 1,499,293 11 13 2 18% 1% 0%
West Palm Beach--Boca Raton, FL MSA 1,131,184 21 3 1 15 5 0 % 0 % 3%
Hartford, CT MSA 1,183,110 13 12 -1 -8% 1% 0%
Las Vegas, NV--AZ MSA 1,563,282 71 2 5 7 1 % 1 % 1 %
Indianapolis, IN MSA 1,607,486 10 11 1 10% 1% 0%
Louisville, KY--IN MSA 1,025,598 6 9 3 50% 1% 1%
Orlando, FL MSA 1,644,561 29 7 3 5 0 % 0 % 2%
Grand Rapids--Muskegon--Holland, MI MSA 1,088,514 48 4 1 0 0 % 0 % 1%
Memphis, TN--AR--MS MSA 1,135,614 5 7 2 40% 0% 0%
Rochester, NY MSA 1,098,201 5 7 2 40% 0% 0%
San Antonio, TX MSA 1,592,383 4 7 3 75% 0% 1%
Jacksonville, FL MSA 1,100,491 4 7 3 75% 0% 1%
Oklahoma City, OK MSA 1,083,346 4 6 2 50% 0% 0%
New Orleans, LA MSA 1,337,726 55 0 0 % 0 % 0 %
Buffalo--Niagara Falls, NY MSA 1,170,111 4 5 1 25% 0% 0%
Norfolk--Virginia Beach--Newport News, VA--NC MSA 1,569,541 25 3 1 5 0 % 0 % 1%
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT MSA 1,333,914 6 4 -2 -33% 1% 0%
Providence--Fall River--Warwick, RI--MA MSA 1,188,613 13 2 2 0 0 % 0 % 0 %
Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill, NC MSA 1,187,941 13 2 2 0 0 % 0 % 0 %
Sacramento--Yolo, CA CMSA 1,796,857 12 1 1 0 0 % 0 % 0 %
Austin--San Marcos, TX MSA 1,249,763 12 1 1 0 0 % 0 % 0 %
Total 162,514,411 1,026 1,437 411 40% 100% 100%
other 219 266
TOTAL 1245 1703Table3: Gross Flows
















New York--Northern New Jersey--Long Island, NY--NJ--CT--PA CMSA 191 30 12 79 12 20 96 80 26 250 9.6
Los Angeles--Riverside--Orange County, CA CMSA 70 9 3 25 3 13 44 29 11 101 9.2
Chicago--Gary--Kenosha, IL--IN--WI CMSA 81 10 3 46 5 1 37 31 17 87 5.1
Washington--Baltimore, DC--MD--VA--WV CMSA 35 10 5 11 5 2 31 17 22 70 3.2
San Francisco--Oakland--San Jose, CA CMSA 46 26 1 23 3 3 31 19 37 83 2.2
Philadelphia--Wilmington--Atlantic City, PA--NJ--DE--MD CMSA 52 11 2 27 3 3 25 20 14 64 4.6
Boston--Worcester--Lawrence, MA--NH--ME--CT CMSA 49 10 2 21 2 2 28 24 12 68 5.7
Detroit--Ann Arbor--Flint, MI CMSA 25 4 0 11 1 1 13 13 4 32 8.0
Dallas--Fort Worth, TX CMSA 52 7 4 22 11 3 31 23 19 79 4.2
Houston--Galveston--Brazoria, TX CMSA 33 12 3 15 4 0 31 15 29 65 2.2
Atlanta, GA MSA 24 4 1 15 5 2 25 6 25 43 1.7
Miami--Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA 13 5 0 6 2 3 16 4 16 30 1.9
Seattle--Tacoma--Bremerton, WA CMSA 17 1 1 8 0 2 7 6 -1 17 -17.0
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ MSA 10 4 0 5 2 0 12 5 13 23 1.8
Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN--WI MSA 36 10 0 23 0 0 15 13 12 38 3.2
Cleveland--Akron, OH CMSA 31 3 2 17 2 2 9 10 0 28 NA
San Diego, CA MSA 9 1 0 3 6 2 8 4 9 21 2.3
St. Louis, MO--IL MSA 24 4 2 13 2 3 20 6 15 37 2.5
Denver--Boulder--Greeley, CO CMSA 10 0 0 4 2 1 19 5 15 27 1.8
Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearwater, FL MSA 9 4 1 1 1 2 13 5 10 26 2.6
Pittsburgh, PA MSA 17 1 0 6 2 2 9 9 1 23 23.0
Portland--Salem, OR--WA CMSA 13 0 1 7 1 0 5 5 0 12 NA
Cincinnati--Hamilton, OH--KY--IN CMSA 16 3 3 8 2 0 7 5 4 20 5.0
Sacramento--Yolo, CA CMSA 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1.0
Kansas City, MO--KS MSA 14 4 2 8 1 0 3 4 2 14 7.0
Milwaukee--Racine, WI CMSA 17 2 1 10 1 0 9 6 5 19 3.8
Orlando, FL MSA 2 1 0 0 3 0 5 2 7 11 1.6
Indianapolis, IN MSA 10 1 0 3 2 2 5 5 1 15 15.0
S a n  A n t o n i o ,  T X  M S A 4 20 2 1 0 2 237 2 . 3
Norfolk--Virginia Beach--Newport News, VA--NC MSA 2 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 3 3 1.0
Las Vegas, NV--AZ MSA 7 1 1 2 2 1 7 3 5 15 3.0
Columbus, OH MSA 11 2 0 8 3 0 6 3 8 14 1.8
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill, NC--SC MSA 11 1 0 9 1 0 2 2 2 6 3.0
New Orleans, LA MSA 5 0 0 2 1 0 2 3 0 6 NA
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT MSA 6 1 1 0 0 0 3 5 -2 10 -5.0
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA 6 3 0 4 4 0 3 2 8 12 1.5
Austin--San Marcos, TX MSA 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3.0
Nashville, TN MSA 7 2 0 5 1 0 16 2 17 21 1.2
Providence--Fall River--Warwick, RI--MA MSA 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 1.0
Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill, NC MSA 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 1.0
Hartford, CT MSA 13 1 1 6 1 1 4 5 -1 13 -13.0
Buffalo--Niagara Falls, NY MSA 4 0 0 2 1 0 2 2 1 5 5.0
Memphis, TN--AR--MS MSA 5 1 0 1 2 1 3 3 2 10 5.0
West Palm Beach--Boca Raton, FL MSA 2 3 0 2 5 0 3 0 11 11 1.0
Jacksonville, FL MSA 4 1 1 2 1 0 3 1 3 7 2.3
R o c h e s t e r ,  N Y  M S A 5 31 3 0 0 1 126 3 . 0
Grand Rapids--Muskegon--Holland, MI MSA 4 1 0 2 1 1 4 1 4 8 2.0
O k l a h o m a  C i t y ,  O K  M S A 4 20 4 0 0 0 022 1 . 0
Louisville, KY--IN MSA 6 1 1 2 2 1 4 2 3 11 3.7
Richmond--Petersburg, VA MSA 10 3 1 7 0 0 9 2 9 15 1.7




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Table 6: MFG vs NonMFG (organic moves)
A: MFG
Move In





Move Out NYC 0 2222211 1 2





Other MSA 1212003 09
Elsewhere 01301000 5










Move Out NYC 0 32001107





Other MSA 0433113 01 5
Elsewhere 10000000 1







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sTable 9: Organic and Inorganic Move In Regression
Move In Move In (Organic) Move In (Inorganic)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept -0.72 -3.32 -3.80 -0.95 -3.99 -1.64 0.23 0.67
(1.44) (2.49) (2.44) (1.17) (2.00) (1.61) (0.69) (1.20)
HQs in 1990 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Change in Population 2.25 1.08 4.18 0.89 -0.29 0.82 1.36 1.37
(2.04) (2.16) (2.29) (1.66) (1.73) (1.70) (0.98) (1.04)
MFG Share -0.08 1.34 3.91 -1.35 0.88 -0.97 1.27 0.46
(4.06) (4.60) (5.02) (3.31) (3.70) (3.56) (1.96) (2.22)
FIRE Share 11.46 8.68 -2.03 18.08 14.05 16.90 -6.62 -5.37
(1.16) (11.54) (12.78) (8.99) (9.27) (9.43) (5.31) (5.56)
South 0.60 1.56 1.01 1.00 0.15
(0.60) (0.62) (0.49) (0.50) (0.29)
Avg. Jan Temp. 0.07 0.07 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
% Foreign Born -10.51 -3.38 -7.60 0.71 -2.91
(6.23) (4.80) (5.00) (4.13) (3.00)
% Bachelors Degree 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.03 -0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
% Organic 0.44
(0.82)
R-Squared 0.63 0.64 0.72 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.33 0.35
Adj. R-Squared 0.59 0.58 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.26 0.24
No. Observations 50 50 41 50 50 50 50 50
standard error in parenthesesTable 10: Probability of moving
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
variable
Comp. Level
Co-operating income -0.00003 -0.000029 -0.00003 -0.00003
(-1.36) (-1.29) (-1.42) (-1.29)
% foreign assets -0.26 -0.26 -0.284 -0.26
(-2.24) (-2.11) (-2.69) (-2.10)
Large -0.04 -0.07 -0.031 -0.069
(-1.06) (-2.57) (-0.89) (-2.58)
Grow -0.03 -0.05 -0.024 -0.049
(-0.84) (-1.84) (-0.69) (-1.80)
# of corporate actions 0.02 0.02 0.021 0.024
(-2.14) (2.20) (1.96) (2.21)
MFG -0.041 0.03 -0.047 0.029
(-0.88) (0.64) (-0.98) (0.67)
TRANSP. 0.006 0.12 0.003 0.12
(0.11) (2.05) (0.06) (2.04)
TRADE -0.084 -0.03 -0.087 -0.028
(-1.73) (-.62) (-1.86) (-0.58)
FIRE -0.55 -0.004 -0.056 0.0004
(-1.01) (-0.07) (-1.04) (-0.06)
SERVICE -0.15 0.034 -0.02 0.036




level Pop in 90 0.0096 0.012
(4.16) (4.50)




Avg. Jan temp 0.0008 0.001
(0.54) (0.65)
% bachelor's degree -0.44 -0.45
(-2.23) (-2.30)
# foreign air destinations 1990 -0.001 -0.0008
(-2.65) (-1.06)
MSA % foreign assets -0.436 -0.45
(-1.81) (-1.86)
wage cost 1990 -0.000006 -0.000005
-(0.06) (-1.03)
Pseudo Rsquared 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.12
# observ. 1009 851 1009 851
Logl.hood -389.3 -282.3 -387.1 -282.1
tstats in parentheses1
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